There is a consensus in monetary policy circles that the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing (QE), have significantly reduced long-term yields. The consensus is due in part to event studies, which show that long-term yields decline on QE announcement days. The quality of the event-study evidence depends critically on whether these announcement effects are identified. This paper undertakes a detailed analysis of the identification of the QE announcement effects using three bond yields and the announcements used in the literature. Because identification using the event-study methodology typically involves some judgment, the analysis relies on the reasonable person standard, which the U.S. Supreme Court recently broadened to include questions such as "are the QE announcement effects identified?" JEL Codes: E43, E52, E58 Key Words: quantitative easing, large-scale asset purchases, FOMC, event-study, announcement effect significantly reduced long-term yields, suggesting that monetary policy can be effective even when the policy rate is at its zero lower bound. Studies of the effectiveness of QE have used several methodologies; however, this paper focuses exclusively on event-studies (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce et al., 2010; Neely, 2011; Swanson, 2011; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012 ) that find that long-term yields declined after certain speeches by chairman Bernanke and QE announcements.
INTRODUCTION
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy announcement on September 15, 2008, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began undertaking large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), also known as quantitative easing (QE), with the objectives of supporting the mortgage market and reducing longer-term yields. Consensus exists in monetary policy circles that QE has significantly reduced long-term yields, suggesting that monetary policy can be effective even when the policy rate is at its zero lower bound. Studies of the effectiveness of QE have used several methodologies; however, this paper focuses exclusively on event-studies (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce et al., 2010; Neely, 2011; Swanson, 2011; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012 ) that find that long-term yields declined after certain speeches by chairman Bernanke and QE announcements.
These event studies have contributed to the consensus that QE has reduced long-term yields. 1 Consequently, it is important to investigate the extent to which the announcement effects obtained in this literature provide evidence of QE's effectiveness. Hence, this paper contributes to the event-study literature on QE by investigating whether the announcement effects obtained using the event-study methodology are identified. Because the identification of announcement effects typically involves judgment, I suggest that identification be evaluated using the reasonable person standard. The reasonable person standard originated in common law and is used in criminal and contract law to establish the standard of care or duty of care. However, the Supreme Court recently (Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida) broadened the use of the reasonable person standard to include questions such as would the event-study facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that QE reduced long-term yields? 2 The reasonable person standard is a subjective evaluation of the extent to which the event-study announcement effects are identified.
The analysis applies the event-study methodology to three bond yields: the 10-year
Treasury yield, which is always used in this literature, and the yields on Aaa -and Baa -rated corporate bonds. The announcement effects obtained are similar to those in the literature. I then investigate whether these announcement effects are identified.
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 discusses identification requirements of the event-study methodology and how the QE event-study literature has handled them. Section 3 obtains announcement effects with the announcements used in the QE literature, and analyzes the extent to which these announcement effects are identified. Section 4 undertakes a more detailed investigation of a subset of announcements that show the most promise of being identified. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Event studies look at the high-frequency (daily or higher) response of yields to important announcements or events believed to be associated with QE. This section discusses the identification requirements of event studies and how the QE event-study literature has handled identification. The latter discussion draws heavily on the event-study of Gagnon et al. (2011) because it was one of the first studies to evaluate the effectiveness of QE using the event-study methodology, it is widely cited, and it attempts to deal with identification. Gagnon et al. (2011) calculated the change in bond yields on days using a variety of announcements. Specifically, they considered three types of announcements: FOMC statements and other Fed announcements related to QE, speeches by Chairman Bernanke, and the release of FOMC minutes. In order for the announcement effect to be identified, these announcements must contain some new unexpected information about QE, that is, "news." This requirement stems from the idea that financial markets are efficient in the sense that all known information is already reflected in asset prices. Consequently, asset prices respond only to news. If the FOMC undertook an action that was anticipated, the announcement would provide new information, but not much news: the smaller the news, the smaller the announcement effect. It is important to note that the QE event-study literature does not specifically attempt to identify the unexpected component in each QE announcement. Consequently, it difficult to determine whether the announcement effects are statistically significant (this problem is discussed in detail later). Event studies do not investigate the contrapositive, that is, the fact that the absence of an announcement effect does not necessarily imply that QE does not reduce bond yields because if the news was anticipated, bond yields would have declined in advance of the announcement. 3 Finally, the literature says nothing about whether there is news in the lack of an announcement, that is, the market was expecting something that did not happen.
The Announcements Must Contain News

The Announcement Effect Must Be Attributable Solely to the Announcement
To be identified the announcement effect must be attributable solely to the announcement and not to other information. In the case of asset prices, this requirement is less likely to be satisfied the longer the period of time over which the announcement effect is measured. Most of the QE event-study literature uses daily changes in bond yields. This means that there must be some reasonable expectation that a change in bond yields on the announcement day is due solely to the QE announcement and not to other news during the day. Bond yields respond to a wide range of information, so it is possible that some or all of the observed change in bond yields on announcement days might be due to news other than QE news. This problem is particularly severe if the announcement itself contains QE and other news. In such cases, the announcement effect is identified only if the other news would have moved yields in the opposite direction of the QE news.
QE Event Studies and Identification
Table 1 provides a list QE announcements used in the QE event-study literature and the change 10-year Treasury yield ( 10 T ), and the yields on Aaa and Baa corporate bonds on these days. The sample period is October 1, 2008, through December 31, 2011. The announcements are those used by Gagnon et al. (2011) and Wright (2012) . The "Announcement" columns show the announcement effects associated with Federal Reserve press releases, Bernanke speeches, and FOMC statements. The "Minutes" columns show the announcement effects on days when FOMC minutes were released. The direction and magnitude of these announcement effects are similar to those reported in the literature. The announcements suggested by Gagnon et al. (2011) and Wright (2012) as particularly important are shown in bold type. As is done in the literature, the announcements are also partitioned into "buy" and "sell" announcements: Buy announcements should cause bond yields to decline, while sell announcement should cause yields to rise. Sell announcements are shown in italics.
While the QE announcement effect literature does not differentiate between anticipated and unanticipated announcements, it is reasonable to expect that many of these announcements were unanticipated. This is especially true for the early QE announcements. For example, the noted that it was encouraging that the Fed's November 25 announcement "was met by a fall in mortgage interest rates," and (ii) suggested that the Fed might undertake additional "purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant." However, the Chairman discussed several other issues, such as the economic outlook and the difficulty keeping the funds rate close to its 1 percent target level. Hence, it is not unreasonable to think that bond yields might have reacted to other news in the speech and not solely to the QE information (Appendix A provides the QE and other news associated with the "announcements" column in Table 1 ).
The announcement effects associated with the release of FOMC minutes do not meet the requirements for identification for at least two reasons. First, the minutes provide no new information about the FOMC's QE actions or intentions. At best, they provide information about differing views of FOMC members about the desirability and/or the effectiveness of LSAPs.
Second, because they lack specific information, it is impossible to determine whether the announcement effect should be positive or negative. If the announcement effect cannot be signed, it is not identified.
Statistically Significant Announcement Effects
Announcement effects must be statistically significant. That is, changes in bond yields must be statistically significantly different from what they would have otherwise been.
Determining statistical significance is complicated by the fact that there is no unit of measure for the quantity of the news: The announcement effect is the basis-point change in the bond yield per announcement, but all announcements do not contain the same amount of news. For example, the November 25, 2008, and March 18, 2009 , announcements provided news about unprecedented large asset purchases. Consequently, one might expected these announcements provided a lot of news. In contrast, the August 12, 2009, announcement merely stated that "the Committee has decided to gradually slow the pace of these transactions and anticipates that the full amount will be purchased by the end of October." The FOMC had previously indicated "autumn" (autumn starts on the September equinox-September 22 in 2009). Relative to the information in the November 25, 2008, and March 18, 2009 , announcements, the "quantity" of news in the August 12, 2009, announcement appears to be tiny.
How Event Studies Have Handle Identification
The event-study literature is aware that all announcements do not contain the same quantity of news. Most researchers attempt to deal with this problem by paying special attention to a subset of the QE announcements they consider particularly important. For example, Gagnon et al. (2011) focus on "a narrow set of official communications, each of which contained new information concerning the potential or actual expansion of the size, composition, and/or timing of LSAPs" (p. 17). They call these announcement their "baseline" event set.
To ensure that the announcement effect is due to the announcement and not to other news during the day, some event studies calculate the announcement effect over a sufficiently short period of time that the response could be due only to the announcement and not to other information that day. This approach reasonably identifies the response to the announcements from other information during the day; however, it cannot separate the effect of the QE news from the effect of other news in the announcement. As noted previously, this is a problem for FOMC policy statements. Moreover, estimating the announcement effect over a short period immediately following the announcement runs the risk of overstating the effect on bond yields over the day: The day's change in bond yields could be much smaller, or possibly opposite in sign, than the daily change. This would happen if the market overreacted to the announcement or if the announcement effect was partially or totally offset by subsequent news.
ARE THE QE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS IDENTIFIED?
This section investigates whether the announcement effects presented in Table 1 are identified. The analysis begins with the problem of determining whether the announcement effects are statistically significant. As noted previously, determining statistical significance is complicated by the lack of a unit of measure of the news contained in the announcements. In an attempt to deal with the possibility that announcement effects measured at the daily frequency could be contaminated by other news, Wright (2012) scaled QE announcements in a manner similar to that proposed by Kuttner (2001) In the absence of an appropriate unit of measure, a reasonable way to investigate statistical significance is to determine whether changes in bond yields on QE announcement days differ significantly from changes on days with no QE announcements. Because a QE announcement might be expected to have an effect on bond yields similar to the effect of other economic announcements, it is desirable to include in the set of announcement days additional days with macroeconomic announcements. Hence, the set of announcement days includes all of 4 This problem arose in the event-study literature that investigated the effect on monetary policy shocks on bond yields by estimating the effect of changes in the FOMC's target for the federal funds rate on bond yields. Kuttner (2001) noted that some of the target changes could have been anticipated, so the unexpected component of target changes could differ in size even if the change in the target was identical. This means that the 5-basis-point change in a yield associated with a 50-basis-point change in the target might be statistically insignificant; however, if only 10 basis points of the 50-basis-point change were unanticipated, that would not necessarily be the case. This led him to suggest that the magnitude of target changes be normalized by the response of the federal funds futures rate to target changes, so the change in bond yields is expressed in terms of the basis-point change in the federal funds futures rate. While this approach solves the normalization problem, it gives rise to another (see Thornton, 2013 for details). 5 Wright (2012) reports that his results are similar using a 15-minute window. 6 Moreover, this procedure implicitly assumes that all changes in futures prices are statistically significant, but as we will see later, there are reasons to doubt this assumption.
the QE announcements shown in Table 1 announcements. However, the fact that the coefficients are statistically significant does not necessarily rule out the possibility that these announcements had no statistically significant effect on bond yields: The sample size is small (15 observations), nearly all of the changes in bond yields on these days were positive, and only 5 of the 45 changes in the three bond yields are 12 basis points or larger.
Are the Changes in Bond Yields Due to the Announcements?
This section investigates the extent to which the announcement effects shown in the "Announcement" columns in Table 1 are due to the announcements or other information. Some insight into this question can be obtained by using intraday data on the price of the 10-year Treasury futures contract. If the response is due to the announcement, there should be a relatively large change in the futures price immediately following the announcement and the immediate response should account for a relatively large percentage of the daily price change. Table 3 shows the percent change in the price of the 10-year Treasury futures from 5 minutes before the announcement to 15 and 45 minutes after the announcement. The FOMC's policy statement is normally released at 2:15 p.m. and is highly anticipated, so the market would respond very quickly to it: Thus, the 15-minute window would seem appropriate for FOMC policy statements. Bernanke's speeches and other announcements are not as well anticipated, so the 45-minute window would seem more appropriate. The change in the futures price from open to close is also calculated to determine the percent of the daily change accounted for the immediate reaction to the announcements. The first column shows the date and time of the announcement. The rows associated with the QE announcements that are considered to be important are shown in bold type. Columns (2) and (3) show the returns for the 15-minute and 45-minute windows, respectively. Column (4) shows the daily return. Columns (5) and (6) However, the futures prices decreased rather than increased, as they should have in response to buy announcements. The daily change in the three bond yields was very small and there was no uniformity in the direction of changes for the April announcement. These findings are broadly consistent with the fact that these announcements contained relatively little QE or other news (see Appendix A).
The other two exceptions are the January 27, 2010, and March 16, 2010, FOMC statements. The immediate change in the futures price was relatively large on both days.
However, futures price decrease after the January announcement and increased after the March announcement. Again, the changes in the three bond yields were small and not uniform in direction following the January announcement, while the March announcement accounts for less than half of the change in the futures price on the day. Moreover, neither announcement provides much QE or other news (see the appendix). The evidence strongly suggests that the announcement effects for announcements that are not considered important are not identified;
hence, these announcements are not considered further.
The Identification of Important QE Announcements
With five exceptions, when the relevant high-frequency response was small and in the opposite direction of the daily change, the response of the futures price to the announcements However, only two announcements are associated with changes in bond yields greater than or equal to 12 basis points.
ARE THESE 11 ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS IDENTIFIED?
The analysis in the previous sections indicates that 11 of the announcements considered might provide evidence of the effectiveness of QE. These announcements contained specific QE news that could have affected market participants' expectations of future LSAPs; the immediate changes in the 10-year Treasury future price are relatively large. Moreover, six of these announcements are associated with changes in bond yields greater than or equal to 12 basis points, and most of the others are associated with changes in bond yields greater than or equal to 7 basis points (the absolute change in the three bond yields on non-announcement days was at least 7 basis points on between 28 and 33 percent of the days). In most cases, the direction of the announcement effect is consistent with the maintained hypothesis. Hence, this section analyzes the extent to which these 11 announcements provide evidence of the effectiveness of QE; that is, whether these announcement effects are identified. Panel A in Figure 1 shows the first three event-study announcements. These announcements occurred after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy announcement when bond yields were relatively volatile. 9 Indeed, the 10-year Treasury and Aaa bond yields decreased by at least 12 basis points on 6 and 7 days, respectively, of the 30 trading days before to the November 25, 2008, QE announcement; the 10-year Treasury and Aaa bond yields decreased by 15 basis points on four days and 28 basis points on one day; the Aaa bond yield decreased by 23 basis points on another day.
The November 25 announcement mentioned only asset purchases, so it seems reasonable to assume that the announcement effects associated with this announcement are due to the QE news. However, bond yields had been declining and were unusually volatile prior to the November 25 announcement. Moreover, Panel A shows that the Treasury yield was declining relative to the corporate yields and the Aaa yield was declining faster than the Baa yield, that is, credit risk spreads were widening. Furthermore, the 10-year Treasury yield changed by at least 12 basis points on 5 of the 7 days prior to the announcement, with a cumulative change of -49 basis points. More concerning for identification purposes is the fact that this announcement occurred at 8:15 a.m., just shortly after the market opened. Hence, it is difficult to say definitively that the changes in bond yields were due to the QE news or simply a continuation of market forces that had been driving yields lower and credit risk spreads wider prior to the announcement.
Alternatively, it is possible that market participants took the Fed's announcement as an indicator of deteriorating economic and financial market conditions and were responding to this rather than the QE news in the announcement per se. 10 Neely (2011) and others note that there 9 The standard deviation of changes in bond yields or the absolute value of changes in bond yields on nonannouncement days is 50 to 80 percent larger from September 1, 2008 , to March 31, 2009 , than over the remainder of the sample. 10 Raskin (2013) finds that the market interpreted changes in the FOMC's date-based forward guidance as indicating a weaker economic outlook, and Thornton (2011) finds that the joint statement of the Fed and other central banks that accompanied the Fed's Term Auction Facility caused market risk premiums to increase significantly.
was no corresponding large negative change in equity prices on that day, suggesting that if market participants' economic outlook had become more pessimistic, equity prices should have declined significantly that day as well. However, this critique of the alternative hypothesis is valid only if daily changes in bond yields and stock prices are highly correlated on days when there is important news that could affect market participants' economic outlook. If there is a strong correlation between changes in bond yields and changes in stock prices on such days, the lack of a significantly large move in stock prices would provide relatively strong evidence against the revision-in-economic-outlook explanation for the decline in bond yields. However, this does not appear to be the case. Over the sample period used here the correlation between changes in the S&P 500 index and changes in these bond yields is nearly zero on all days in the sample and only slightly higher on days with relatively large changes in bond yields ( ≥ 12 basis points), ranging from 6 percent for the Baa yield to 12 percent for the Aaa bond yield. have declined…Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further." The statement also contained information about QE; "The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities." The fact that these announcements contained news about both the economy and QE makes it difficult to know whether the announcement effect is due to the QE news without additional information.
The announcement effect associated with the December 16 announcement was also relatively large, 13 to 16 basis points. That statement contained QE news: "The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities" and "will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity," It also contained other news: "Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further." Again, it is difficult to say definitively which piece of news generated the announcement effect. Indeed, it need not be one or the other; it could be both.
The identification of these announcement effects is further complicated by the following facts: (i) Bond yields had been declining significantly in advance of these announcements.
(ii)
Bond yields were much more volatile for a period following Lehman Bros.'s bankruptcy announcement, (iii) Credit risk spreads were generally widening. These facts raise the possibility that at least some of the observed change in bond yields on these days would have occurred anyway. Finally, it is reasonable to think that if market participants believed that QE would drive long-term yields significantly lower, yields would have declined more rapidly following these announcements. Panel A in Figure 1 suggests this did not happen. 12 Indeed, bond yields began rising shortly after the December 16 announcement.
As noted earlier, the November 25, 2008, announcement effect might have been due to market forces that had been working to reduce bond yields and increase risk premiums prior to 12 A simple statistical test for this is to regress the change in bond yields on a constant term and a dummy variable that is 1 on the day of the first announcement and thereafter and 0 otherwise. If there was a significant increase in the rate of decline in the bond yields, the coefficient on the dummy variable would be negative and statistically sufficiently different from zero. The coefficients from several variants of this test were always very small and never statistically significantly different from zero; however, the sample size is very small, so the tests have little power. decline, but bond yields rose between 12 and 15 basis points on January 28 and continued to rise for a period thereafter. Hence, it is possible that the change in bond yields was due to the (unknown) market forces that had been causing bond yields to rise prior to the announcement and thereafter. 13 This possibility is also consistent with the fact that the immediate response of the Treasury future price on that day accounts for less than 30 percent of the daily change.
Panel C in Figure 1 shows the response of bond yields to the FOMC's March 18, 2009, announcement. The QE part of the announcement is very dramatic and there is no reason to believe that it was anticipated. The Treasury futures price response was immediate and large, and it accounted for nearly all of the change on that day. The daily changes in bond yields were corresponding large; 51 basis points for 10-year Treasury yield and 24 and 23 basis points, respectively, for the Aaa and Baa bonds. Bond yields had been rising. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the announcement effects were due to anything other than the FOMC announcement. The fact that the QE news was stunningly large-additional purchases in the amount of $1.15 trillion-lends credence to the effectiveness-of-QE conclusion that bond yields fell in anticipation of the increased demand for long-term debt by the Fed. 13 One possibility is that bond yields were reflecting some improvement in the economy that was not reflected in the FOMC statement. 14 Regardless of the explanation, the marked decline in bond yields was short-lived. Bond yields began increasing the next day and essentially returned to their pre-announcement levels within about 20 days of the announcement. This fact would appear to lend credence to the possibility that the dramatic, but relatively temporary, decline in bond yields occurred because the FOMC's economic outlook ran counter to market participants' economic outlook. Hence, a reasonable alternative explanation for the behavior of bond yields is the upward trend in bond yields, significant narrowing of risk spreads, and perhaps other information suggesting the economy was improving. Consequently, the FOMC's more pessimistic outlook, coupled with unprecedented actions, caused market participants to temporarily reassess their economic outlook. Of course, there is no objective way to differentiate between these interpretations.
14 The Fed's creation of the Term Auction Facility appears to have caused market participants to alter their beliefs about the severity of the financial crisis (Thornton, 2011) .
However, the fact that the effect was very temporary would appear more consistent with the shock-to-the-economic-outlook hypothesis than with the effectiveness-of-QE hypothesis. If bond yields declined because the market believed that the massive increase in demand for debt would reduce bond yields, the effect should have been more persistent.
Identifying announcement: "The Committee will gradually slow the pace of these purchases in order to promote a smooth transition in markets and anticipates that they will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010." Nevertheless, bond yields declined modestly, just 1 or 2 basis points.
Panel E in Figure 1 shows there were relatively large increases in bond yields associated with the November 4, 2009, announcement. This announcement is also treated as a sell announcement:"The Committee will gradually slow the pace of its purchases of both agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities and anticipates that these transactions will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010." The other information was somewhat bullish:
"Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September suggests that economic activity has continued to pick up." Hence, either piece of news could account for the 7 to 9-basis-point rise in bond yields. However, the immediate response of the 10-year Treasury futures price was rather small, 0.11 percent, and accounted for only about 40 percent of the change that day. Hence, the possibility that there was not statistically significant announcement effect on this day cannot be ruled out. In any event, bond yields began falling shortly after the announcement. however, the Treasury yield decreased 7 basis points while the corporate yields increased just 2 to 3 basis points. Given the small size of the announcement effects and the fact that they are not uniform in direction, a reasonable conclusion would be there was no statistically significant announcement effect.
Yields, which had been declining, increased following Bernanke's August 27, 2010, speech and continued to increase for a period thereafter. Moreover, the immediate response of the Treasury futures price was relatively large, about a half of percentage point, and accounts for about half of the daily change. Hence, the evidence is fairly strong that the market responded to Bernanke's speech and the response was statistically significant. However, the direction of the change in yields implied by the QE news in the speech is unclear. On the one hand, Bernanke indicated that the Committee was prepared to take additional unconventional measures especially should the outlook deteriorate significantly. On the other hand, he suggested that additional measures might entail additional risks, which would seem to suggest that a larger deterioration in the outlook might be necessary for the FOMC to make additional asset purchases than previously. Hence, it is difficult to know the expected sign of the response to the QE news. On balance Bernanke's assessment of the economic outlook was pessimistic, which should have caused bond yields to fall, not rise.
However, the speech did contain other information. In summing up the economic outlook, Bernanke noted that "Recently, inflation has declined to a level that is slightly below that which FOMC participants view as most conducive to a healthy economy in the long run.
With inflation expectations reasonably stable and the economy growing, inflation should remain near current readings for some time before rising slowly toward levels more consistent with the Committee's objectives." Hence, this statement could have caused market participants to revise their expectations for inflation upward, causing bond yields to rise. In any event, Panel F shows the effect on the Treasury yield was completely offset within two days of the announcement, while the change in the corporate bond yields was largely offset. Yields rose for a period after the speech before declining again. Indeed, the Treasury yield was below its August 27 level within 20 days of the announcement, while corporate yields remained above their August 27 levels (i.e., risk premiums generally rose during this period).
The announcement effects associated with Bernanke's October 15, 2010, speech are shown in Panel G in Figure 1 . His October speech was similar to his August 27 speech in content. The economic outlook was somewhat pessimistic, and he reiterated the point made in his August 27 speech that the FOMC could engage in additional asset purchases if conditions warrant but noted that the beneficial effects of such an action would have to be weighed against the additional risks. He also discussed the role of forward guidance, noting that the most recent policy statements noted that the funds rate might be zero "for an extended period," and suggested that the Committee could "modify the language of the statement in some way that indicates that the Committee expects to keep the target for the federal funds rate low for longer than markets expect," should conditions warrant it. This statement should have caused rates to fall not rise.
The immediate response to Bernanke's speech was relatively large and accounted for about half of the daily change in the futures price; however, the changes in bond yields are relatively small.
Hence, the possibility that the announcement effects are not statistically significant cannot be ruled out.
Panel H in Figure 1 shows the announcement effect associated with the August 9, 2011, FOMC statement. The announcement is associated with a 20-basis-point drop in the Treasury yield and a decline in corporate bond yields about half that size. There was no QE news in the policy statement; however, the economic outlook was pessimistic: "The Committee now expects a somewhat slower pace of recovery over coming quarters than it did at the time of the previous meeting and anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to be consistent with its dual mandate." Perhaps the bigger news was that three voting members of the Committee dissented against adding a calendar date-"at least through mid-2013"-to the forward guidance statement.
In any event, Panel H shows that bond yields had been declining before the announcement and either increased slightly or declined more slowly after the announcement. The reaction could have been due to the Committee's more pessimistic outlook, the extension of the forward guidance period, or the large number of dissents. However, the forward guidance statement could have an effect only if it extended the forward guidance period beyond what the market had anticipated. Given the alternative explanations for the change in bond yields, it is difficult to conclude that the announcement effects associated with this announcement provide useful information about the effectiveness of the FOMC's QE policy.
An Epilogue
The fact that nearly all of the 11 announcement effects were completely offset within a month or two of the announcement suggests that, irrespective of what caused the response of bond yields, the effect appears to be short lived. Persistence of the effect is critical for the efficacy of QE because the FOMC's LSAPs are intended to reduce longer-term yields in order to stimulate investment and consumption and, thereby, economic growth and employment.
Of course, event studies provide no information about the persistence of the announcement effects; additional information is required. Gagnon et al. (2011) and others are aware of this problem and use other information to infer that the QE announcement effects are persistent. Gagnon et al. (2011) attempt to determine the persistence of their announcement effects by comparing the sum of the changes in bond yields on their baseline announcement days with the sum of the changes in bond yields on non-announcement days. They show that the sum of all the announcement effects on their baseline announcement days is negative for all yields considered. In contrast, with the exception of the Baa bond yield, the sum of changes in bond yields on non-announcement days is positive. They attribute the cumulative positive change on non-announcement days to a variety of factors and suggest that "it is likely those factors, and not a reversal of the effects of the LSAP announcements, that drove Treasury yields higher on other days" (p.21), that is, the announcement effects were long-lasting or permanent.
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Of course, a simple comparison of the cumulative change on eight announcement days with the cumulative change on all other days says nothing about the permanency of the effect unless additional assumptions are made. 16 For example, this approach would be reasonable if bonds yields are integrated of order one, I(1), because the response to any news would be permanent. Strictly speaking, bond yields cannot be I(1) because the lower bound nominal interest rates is zero. 17 Nevertheless, bond yields are highly persistent (i.e., they have roots that are very close to 1). Wright (2012) uses the persistence in bond yields to estimate the persistence of the QE announcement effects, which he identifies using a statistical procedure called identification through heteroskedasticity. 18 His results suggest that the half-life of QE announcements is relatively short, about 2 to 3 months. 19 Either of these approaches assumes that the observed persistence in bond yields is a characteristic of bond yields per se rather than the news (or shocks) that drives bond yields. In any event, the persistence in bond yields may overstate the persistence of the announcement effect because most analysts believe that QE works by reducing the slope of the yield curve (e.g., Gagnon et al., 2011, and Bernanke, 2008) .
In this case, the persistence of the announcement effect would be better estimated from the persistence of the slope of the yield curve, which is less persistent than bond yields themselves, so the half-life would be considerably shorter. 20 Of course, none of these approaches considers the possibility that the market might initially overreact to an LSAP announcement even at the daily frequency. Several examples of overreaction of Treasury futures prices are shown in Table   3 . The most dramatic is the reaction to Bernanke's December 1, 2008, speech: The initial reaction was nearly 4.5 times larger than the change on that day.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be a consensus in monetary policy circles that the FOMC's QE actions have significantly reduced long-term yields. The effectiveness of QE in reducing long-term 17 To understand why, see Thornton (1999) . 18 Identification through heteroskedasticity is a method for separating the response of bond yields on QE announcement days from other days by making an assumption about the variance of yields on announcement days relative to other days.
yields has been investigated using alternative methodologies. An important piece of evidence in this literature comes from event studies that find relatively large announcement effects associated with various QE announcements. The quality of the event-study evidence depends critically on whether these announcement effects are identified. Identification in the event-study literature means that the announcement effects are statistically significant and are due solely to QE news.
This paper investigated the extent to which the announcement effects considered in this literature are identified. Because identification using the event-study methodology nearly always entails an element of uncertainty, the paper investigates whether the QE announcement effects are identified sufficiently to meet the reasonable person evidentiary standard established recently by the U.S. Supreme Court.
All things considered, the evidence is strong that none of the announcement effects associated with the release of FOMC minutes is identified: It is difficult to see how a reasonable period could consider these announcement effects as evidence of the effectiveness of QE.
For all but 11 of the 28 other announcements considered in the literature, the evidence presented here suggests that either the observed announcement effect was not due to the announcement, the announcement effect was not statistically significant, or both. Hence, it seems unlikely that a reasonable person would consider these announcement effects as evidence that QE reduced long-term yields.
For all but one of the remaining 11 announcements, the announcement contained news in addition to news about QE that could have caused the observed announcement effects. Despite the fact that this means, strictly speaking, these announcement effects are not identified, a reasonable person might conclude that these announcement effects are evidence that QE caused bond yields to decline. The interpretation depends on (i) whether one believes the announcement effects are statistically significant (in some cases) and (ii) which explanation for the behavior of bond yields is the most plausible.
The November 25, 2008, announcement contains only QE news. The 10-year Treasury futures contract responded quickly to the announcement and the reaction accounts for nearly 70 percent of the daily change in the futures price. Hence, this announcement effect would appear to provide unqualified evidence that QE reduces long-term yields. However, this conclusion is problematic because this announcement occurred during a period when bond yields were relatively volatile and moving rapidly in the direction of hypothesized announcement effect.
Hence, some or most of the announcement effect could be due to a continuation of market forces that were driving yields down and risk spreads up. The fact that this announcement occurred at 8:15 a.m., shortly after the market opened, increases the likelihood the announcement effect was not due solely to the QE announcement. Hence, a reasonable person might conclude that even this announcement effect does not provide unqualified evidence that QE reduces long-term yields.
Identification of announcement effects is difficult because of the difficulty inherent in measuring the quantity of information in the announcement (e.g., Thornton, 2013) . Identification is particularly severe in the QE announcement effect literature because (i) most of the announcements in this literature contain other news that could account for the observed announcement effects and (ii) some announcement effects could be due to information not contained in the announcement. Whether a person believes that the announcement effects in the QE literature provide evidence that QE reduces long-term yields depends on whether one finds the QE or alternative explanation of the announcement effects convincing. Once all the facts are known, reasonable persons-such as the readers of this paper, must decide whether the eventstudy announcement effects provide convincing evidence that QE reduced long-term yields. Gagnon et al. (2012) and Wright (2012) as particularly important are shown in bold type. Sell announcements are shown in italics. See Appendix A for news contained in the "announcements" columns of the table. Gagnon et al. (2012) and Wright (2012) as particularly important are shown in bold type and the corresponding column are shaded. The numbers that are most relevant for a particular announcement are in bold type. The Federal Reserve announced on Tuesday that it will initiate a program to purchase the direct obligations of housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks-and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. Spreads of rates on GSE debt and on GSEguaranteed mortgages have widened appreciably of late. This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally.
Purchases of up to $100 billion in GSE direct obligations under the program will be conducted with the Federal Reserve's primary dealers through a series of competitive auctions and will begin next week. Purchases of up to $500 billion in MBS will be conducted by asset managers selected via a competitive process with a goal of beginning these purchases before year-end. Purchases of both direct obligations and MBS are expected to take place over several quarters.
Further information regarding the operational details of this program will be provided after consultation with market participants.
Other News: None
Bernanke speech, 12/1/2008 QE News: …there are several means by which the Fed could influence financial conditions through the use of its balance sheet, beyond expanding our lending to financial institutions. First, the Fed could purchase longer-term Treasury or agency securities on the open market in substantial quantities. This approach might influence the yields on these securities, thus helping to spur aggregate demand. Indeed, last week the Fed announced plans to purchase up to $100 billion in GSE debt and up to $500 billion in GSE mortgage-backed securities over the next few quarters. It is encouraging that the announcement of that action was met by a fall in mortgage interest rates.
FOMC Statement, 12/16/2008
QE News: The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities. Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity.
Other News: Since the Committee's last meeting, labor market conditions have deteriorated, and the available data indicate that consumer spending, business investment, and industrial production have declined. Financial markets remain quite strained and credit conditions tight. Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further.
FOMC Statement, 1/28/2009
QE News:
The Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth and to preserve price stability. The focus of the Committee's policy is to support the functioning of financial markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations and other measures that are likely to keep the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet at a high level. The Federal Reserve continues to purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand the quantity of such purchases and the duration of the purchase program as conditions warrant. The Committee also is prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving circumstances indicate that such transactions would be particularly effective in improving conditions in private credit markets.
Other News: Information received since the Committee met in December suggests that the economy has weakened further. Industrial production, housing starts, and employment have continued to decline steeply, as consumers and businesses have cut back spending. Furthermore, global demand appears to be slowing significantly.
FOMC Statement, 3/18/2009
QE News: In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability…To provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months.
Other News:
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January indicates that the economy continues to contract. Job losses, declining equity and housing wealth, and tight credit conditions have weighed on consumer sentiment and spending. Weaker sales prospects and difficulties in obtaining credit have led businesses to cut back on inventories and fixed investment. U.S. exports have slumped as a number of major trading partners have also fallen into recession.
FOMC Statement, 4/29/2009
QE News: In addition, the Federal Reserve will buy up to $300 billion of Treasury securities by autumn.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that the economy has continued to contract, though the pace of contraction appears to be somewhat slower.
FOMC Statement, 6/24/2009
QE News: None
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April suggests that the pace of economic contraction is slowing.
FOMC Statement, 8/12/2009
To promote a smooth transition in markets as these purchases of Treasury securities are completed, the Committee has decided to gradually slow the pace of these transactions and anticipates that the full amount will be purchased by the end of October. The Committee will gradually slow the pace of these purchases in order to promote a smooth transition in markets and anticipates that they will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August suggests that economic activity has picked up following its severe downturn. Conditions in financial markets have improved further, and activity in the housing sector has increased.
FOMC Statement, 11/4/2009
To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve will purchase a total of $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and about $175 billion of agency debt. The amount of agency debt purchases, while somewhat less than the previously announced maximum of $200 billion, is consistent with the recent path of purchases and reflects the limited availability of agency debt. In order to promote a smooth transition in markets, the Committee will gradually slow the pace of its purchases of both agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities and anticipates that these transactions will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September suggests that economic activity has continued to pick up. Conditions in financial markets were roughly unchanged, on balance, over the intermeeting period.
FOMC Statement, 12/16/2009
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November suggests that economic activity has continued to pick up and that the deterioration in the labor market is abating. The housing sector has shown some signs of improvement over recent months. The Committee…will continue to monitor economic developments closely and to evaluate whether additional monetary easing would be beneficial. In particular, the Committee is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly.
A first option for providing additional monetary accommodation, if necessary, is to expand the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer-term securities. As I noted earlier, the evidence suggests that the Fed's earlier program of purchases was effective in bringing down term premiums and lowering the costs of borrowing in a number of private credit markets. I regard the program (which was significantly expanded in March 2009) as having made an important contribution to the economic stabilization and recovery that began in the spring of 2009…I believe that additional purchases of longer-term securities, should the FOMC choose to undertake them, would be effective in further easing financial conditions. However, the expected benefits of additional stimulus from further expanding the Fed's balance sheet would have to be weighed against potential risks and costs. One risk of further balance sheet expansion arises from the fact that, lacking much experience with this option, we do not have very precise knowledge of the quantitative effect of changes in our holdings on financial conditions. In particular, the impact of securities purchases may depend to some extent on the state of financial markets and the economy; for example, such purchases seem likely to have their largest effects during periods of economic and financial stress, when markets are less liquid and term premiums are unusually high. The possibility that securities purchases would be most effective at times when they are most needed can be viewed as a positive feature of this tool. However, uncertainty about the quantitative effect of securities purchases increases the difficulty of calibrating and communicating policy responses.
Another concern associated with additional securities purchases is that substantial further expansions of the balance sheet could reduce public confidence in the Fed's ability to execute a smooth exit from its accommodative policies at the appropriate time. Even if unjustified, such a reduction in confidence might lead to an undesired increase in inflation expectations. (Of course, if inflation expectations were too low, or even negative, an increase in inflation expectations could become a benefit.) To mitigate this concern, the Federal Reserve has expended considerable effort in developing a suite of tools to ensure that the exit from highly accommodative policies can be smoothly accomplished when appropriate, and FOMC participants have spoken publicly about these tools on numerous occasions. Indeed, by providing maximum clarity to the public about the methods by which the FOMC will exit its highly accommodative policy stance-and thereby helping to anchor inflation expectations-the Committee increases its own flexibility to use securities purchases to provide additional accommodation, should conditions warrant.
Although private final demand, output, and employment have indeed been growing for more than a year, the pace of that growth recently appears somewhat less vigorous than we expected… Incoming data on the labor market have remained disappointing. Private-sector employment has grown only sluggishly, the small decline in the unemployment rate is attributable more to reduced labor force participation than to job creation, and initial claims for unemployment insurance remain high. Firms are reluctant to add permanent employees, citing slow growth of sales and elevated economic and regulatory uncertainty. In lieu of adding permanent workers, some firms have increased labor input by increasing workweeks, offering full-time work to parttime workers, and making extensive use of temporary workers…Overall, the incoming data suggest that the recovery of output and employment in the United States has slowed in recent months, to a pace somewhat weaker than most FOMC participants projected earlier this year. Much of the unexpected slowing is attributable to the household sector, where consumer spending and the demand for housing have both grown less quickly than was anticipated. Consumer spending may continue to grow relatively slowly in the near term as households focus on repairing their balance sheets. I expect the economy to continue to expand in the second half of this year, albeit at a relatively modest pace. To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in September confirms that the pace of recovery in output and employment continues to be slow.
FOMC Statement, 12/14/2010
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November confirms that the economic recovery is continuing, though at a rate that has been insufficient to bring down unemployment.
FOMC Statement, 1/26/2011
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December confirms that the economic recovery is continuing, though at a rate that has been insufficient to bring about a significant improvement in labor market conditions.
FOMC Statement, 3/15/2011
QE News None
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January suggests that the economic recovery is on a firmer footing, and overall conditions in the labor market appear to be improving gradually.
FOMC Statement, 4/27/2011
In particular, the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings and will complete purchases of $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the current quarter.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that the economic recovery is proceeding at a moderate pace and overall conditions in the labor market are improving gradually.
FOMC Statement, 6/22/2011
QE News: The Committee will complete its purchases of $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of this month and will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April indicates that the economic recovery is continuing at a moderate pace, though somewhat more slowly than the Committee had expected. Also, recent labor market indicators have been weaker than anticipated. The slower pace of the recovery reflects in part factors that are likely to be temporary, including the damping effect of higher food and energy prices on consumer purchasing power and spending as well as supply chain disruptions associated with the tragic events in Japan.
FOMC Statement, 8/9/2011
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that economic growth so far this year has been considerably slower than the Committee had expected. Indicators suggest a deterioration in overall labor market conditions in recent months, and the unemployment rate has moved up. Household spending has flattened out, investment in nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing sector remains depressed. To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
Other News: Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that economic growth remains slow. Recent indicators point to continuing weakness in overall labor market conditions, and the unemployment rate remains elevated.
